Peace talks are a critical, but often underappreciated, element of conflict management. While many factors can determine whether a negotiation process succeeds or fails (such as exogenous shocks and structural contexts), the choice of a negotiation framework may also shape the outcome of negotiations. In this article, we examine the selection of the negotiation framework at the onset of the Colombian and Turkish peace processes to identify causal factors that explain the differences in their outcomes.
Historically, peace talks have been undertaken to bring a nonstate armed actor to the negotiating table, reduce the threat of further violence, and resolve conflicts. The negotiated solution of these conflicts will ultimately determine the stability of both states and societies. Consequently, bringing the parties to the table is one of the most challenging aspects of peace negotiations. Various incentives encourage warring parties to engage in these conversations. However, the strategic costs of doing so can be high. Therefore, leaders worry about the potential consequences of their participation in peace talks and wait for these costs to decline before committing to them, according to Stanford University political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro.
This approach results in an enormous variation of the actors, procedures, and substantive discussions that take place during peace talks. For example, a government that makes no legal commitments, maintains a monopoly over information, and excludes third-party mediation and civil society participation will bear an especially high cost throughout the talks; yet, this approach is unlikely to provide the nonstate armed actor with any guarantees or satisfy diverse constituencies.